



Linkages between African Urbanisation and Climate Change

A Policy Brief by the Urban2063 Coalition

URBAN2063

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Linkages between African Urbanisation and Climate Change
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Prologue

This policy brief was prepared by the African Centre for Cities (University of Cape Town) as part of South Africa's hosting of the Group of Twenty (G20). The G20 is organised around three core pillars - *solidarity, equality and sustainability*, and the five main objectives - *inclusive growth, employment, and less inequality; critical minerals; reform of the global financial architecture; artificial intelligence & innovation; and food security*, urbanisation, as one of the most important meta drivers of the 21st Century is absent. Thus, under the auspices of the ACC, an Urban2063 Coalition was formed to focus the G20, and especially the African Union, deliberations on the links between these pillars and objectives and the trajectory of Africa's rapidly growing cities over the next decade.

The stakes attached to Africa's urbanisation, and the prospects of the roughly 900 million people that will be living in African cities in 2035, could not be higher. As "grand living laboratories", African cities could offer new modes of planning, financing, insurance, construction and manufacturing to a global economy seeking to shift from extraction and pollution to circularity and regeneration.¹ This is critical for the African Union's *Agenda 2063* which envisages urbanisation as an "Opportunity ... [for a] positive turn around" in which "cities and other settlements [become] hubs of cultural and economic activities, with modernized infrastructure, and people have access to affordable and decent housing including housing finance together with all the basic necessities of life such as, water, sanitation, energy, public transport and

ICT".² Should the goal of sustainable urbanisation fail, Africa's rapidly evolving urban spaces will default to becoming a source of ecological and social instability, a liability rather than an asset to the global economy.

In order to foster an evidence-based debate across the African continent and with its global partners, the Urban 2063 Coalition produced 8 Policy Briefs on the following topics. The first four briefs are diagnostic and the last set of four is propositional.

1. Demographic and socio-economic data that underpins the urbanisation megatrend;
2. Prevailing fiscal status of African cities and the scope for attracting finance;
3. Linkages between African urbanisation and climate change;
4. Links between trade, industrialisation and urbanisation in Africa;
5. Policy recommendation number one: encourage Multilateral Development Banks to establish a dedicated lines of credit to National Development Banks for subnational lending
6. Policy recommendation number two: anchor the G20 international trade and finance agenda in initiatives that drive structural transformation in African cities;
7. Policy recommendation three: Global financial reform requires a paradigm shift that places African cities at the core; and
8. Policy recommendation four: Improve the quality and reliability of sub-national data through a shared protocol across African Statistical Agencies.

¹ Pieterse, E., (2024), Panel Discussion on Infrastructure Finance at the Africa Urban Forum, Addis Ababa, September 2024.

² African Union (AU), (2015), *Agenda 2063: The Africa We Want*.

Linkages between African Urbanisation and Climate Change

African countries only contributed 9% of global greenhouse gas emissions in 2023 and have contributed 3-4% of the historical build-up of emissions since 1850. Africa is also home to the world's largest carbon sink in the forests and peatlands of the Congo Basin.³ However, urbanisation has driven Africa's emissions from fertiliser use, soils and deforestation (for wood fuel and charcoal) in the past decade, leading the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) to suggest that emissions from Africa amount to 3.9tCO₂e per capita, which is more than "Southern Asia".⁴ Moreover, Africa produces the highest amount of CO₂e emissions per \$1,000, a form of economic un-competitiveness that is likely to become more important.⁵

In September 2023, leaders of the AU member states signed the Nairobi Declaration on Climate Change and Call to Action calling on the global community to accelerate all efforts to reduce emissions and align with the goals of Paris Agreement, honour the 2009 commitment to provide \$100bn in climate finance, implement the Loss and Damage Fund and elevate Africa's share of carbon markets. The declaration set targets of 300GW of renewable energy on the continent by 2030, so as to attract "energy intensive primary processing" back to the continent. Progress on the Nairobi Declaration has been uneven, but is tracked in Table 1 below.

TABLE 1: Nairobi Declaration Targets and Progress

Nairobi Declaration Goal in 2022	Progress as of May 2025
300GW of renewable energy by 2030	60GW (38GW hydro)
Elevated role in carbon markets	Thirty-seven African countries have notified the Paris Agreement Crediting Mechanism of their intention to engage in bilateral trades under Article 6. This is an impressive number of countries but accounts for less than 15% of proposed credits.
Concrete, time-bound action on proposals to reform the multilateral financial system.	Not forthcoming
Shift exports of energy intensive primary processing of Africa's raw material back to the continent	Declining share of global manufacturing, growing number of people without electricity
Promote investments in urban infrastructure including through upgrading informal settlements and slum areas to build climate resilient cities and urban centres	Reasonable investment in infrastructure but increase in urban slum dwellers
Finalise and implement the African Union Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan, to increase resilience	Finalised in August 2024

3 Dargie, G. C. et al., (2017), Age, Extent and Carbon Storage of the Central Congo Basin Peatland Complex, Nature, 542(7639), 86–103; World Bank, (2022), Journey into the Congo Basin: The Lungs of Africa and Beating Heart of the World.

4 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), (2022), Sixth Assessment Report WGII, Chapter 6.

5 World Bank, (2024), Poverty, Prosperity, and Planet Report 2024: Pathways Out of the Polycrisis. Overview booklet, World Bank Group.

20-30% of energy finance for renewables by 2030	20% in 2024 for renewable energy, but only 3.6% of total renewable energy investment
Promote production of green hydrogen	Egypt, Kenya, Mauritania, Morocco, Namibia and South Africa formed the African Green Hydrogen Alliance but production at scale has been slow
Promote clean cooking	The African Development Bank pledged \$2bn over 10 years to support clean cooking and Tanzanian President Samia Saluhu Hassan appointed African Ambassador of clean cooking in January 2025. Voluntary carbon market projects have promoted cookstoves projects. Charcoal remains a dominant cooking fuel and improvements on indoor air pollution, which killed 697,000 people in 2019, have not yet been widely reported.

Sources: Fisher et al., 2021⁶; UNEP, 2025⁷; African Energy Indaba 2024⁸; AfDB, 2025⁹.

African countries are not alone in struggling to attain climate goals. Halfway through the 15-year UNFCCC Paris Agreement reporting cycle, annual global CO₂ emissions were up in 2022, from 35GtCO₂ in 2015 to 37GtCO₂. According to the 2023 Global Stocktake, “GHG [Greenhouse Gas] emission trends and forecasts are not in line with what is needed”.¹⁰ Similarly, an assessment of climate action progress required to meet 2030 targets found 41 out of 42 targets to be lagging.¹¹ As of late 2024, there was no modelled pathway in any of the mainstream climate models that would limit warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius by the end of the century, a threshold that prior IPCC reports had established as a guardrail against runaway climate change.¹² This is

despite decarbonisation in some countries: US reduced its emissions by 6% over the seven years prior to 2022; the EU by 9% and the UK by 25%. China ended the period 16% higher, while all Asia was responsible for half the 2022 CO₂ emissions.¹³ Africa’s emissions in 2022 amounted to (an estimated) 1.5GtCO₂. This is 7% higher than in 2015 and excludes emissions from land-use change and fertilisers, which are reported to have risen sharply. Some estimates place total emissions from the continent closer to 4 billion tCO₂e, which is 3.9tCO₂e per capita (IPCC, 2022, see Figure 1)¹⁴. That being said, the data on African country emissions are known to be inadequate and inconsistent across countries.¹⁵

6 Fisher, S., Bellinger, D. C., Cropper, M. L., Kumar, P., Binagwaho, A., Koudenoukpo, J. B., et al. (2021). Air pollution and development in Africa: impacts on health, the economy, and human capital. *Lancet Planet. Heal.* 5, e681–e688. doi:[https://doi.org/10.1016/S2542-5196\(21\)00201-1](https://doi.org/10.1016/S2542-5196(21)00201-1).

7 United Nations Environmental Programme Copenhagen Climate Centre (UNEP-CCC), (2025), Article 6 Pipeline, UNEP.

8 African Energy Indaba (2024) <https://africaenergyindaba.com/unlocking-africas-potential-addressing-energy-needs-in-the-face-of-rapid-population-growth-2/>

9 AfDB (2025) <https://africa-energy-portal.org/news/afdb-pledges-2bn-clean-cooking-africa-urges-5-energy-investment-sector>

10 UNFCCC, (2020), Global Stocktake. Technical Dialogue Synthesis Report.

11 The share of electric car vehicles tripled between 2000 and 2023, making it the one parameter for which progress is on track. The public financing of fossil fuels represents the parameter that is furthest behind the required rate of change (CAT, 2024).


12 Peters, G. P. (2024). Is limiting the temperature increase to 1.5 °C still possible? doi:10.1177/29768659241293218.

13 UNFCCC, (2020), Global Stocktake. Technical Dialogue Synthesis Report.

14 UNFCCC, (2020), Global Stocktake. Technical Dialogue Synthesis Report. See Figure 1.

15 Mostefaoui, M. et al., (2024), Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Their Trends Over the Last 3 Decades Across Africa, *Earth Syst. Sci. Data*, 16, 245–275.

FIGURE 1: GHG emissions per capita and Human Development Index (HDI) by region



Sources: IPCC Working Group III. Figure TS.1; 'star' for SA (not in IPCC) – GHG inventory, UNDP. Adapted by Winkler in 2024 to add South Africa.

An untold number of reports mention how Africa is disproportionately exposed to climate change.¹⁶ This claim is not objectively wrong. The mean temperature across Africa in 2023 was 0.61°C higher than the 1991-2020 average and 1.23°C above the 1961-1990 baseline.¹⁷ Climate risks “compound” and “cascade” in urban

systems.¹⁸ Delayed progress on removing GHGs from the atmosphere is already resulting in more frequent and intense urban heatwaves and rainfall events, stronger winds, shifting disease vectors and storm surge (for coastal cities). These interact with poor air quality, informal housing, amplify urban risks and disrupt the

16 AfDB (2019) Climate Change in Africa. <https://www.afdb.org/en/cop25/climate-change-africa>; Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), (2022), Sixth Assessment Report WGII, Chapter 6; United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP), (2024), Responding to Climate Change, UNEP.

17 World Meteorological Organization (WMO), (2024), Africa Faces Disproportionate Burden from Climate Change and Adaptation Costs, World Meteorological Organization.

18 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), (2022), Sixth Assessment Report WGII, Chapter 6.

supply chains that sustain the urban economy. **Africa is the only continent in which the number of people dying from so-called natural disasters increased from 2.35 per 100,000 in the period 2005-2014 to 2.39 per 100,000 in the period 2013-2022. The global trend over the same period saw a decline from 1.6 to 1.15.**¹⁹

What the stock phrase on “Africa’s disproportionate climate vulnerability” does not acknowledge is that African countries are disproportionately exposed to almost all global risks and their residents have learned to cope with biophysical risk and the associated economic volatility. Economic disruption is now inevitable: either unabated emissions will drive ever-more damaging weather events or a mass kneejerk reallocation of global capital, focused on decarbonisation and adaptation will be required at some stage in the next two decades.²⁰ Both forms of disruption will be challenging.

By conventional estimates, climate change will add \$25.9billion-40.7 billion to Africa’s investment need, annually, between 2020 and 2030.²¹ There is a growing consensus, however, that this money, or the \$277 billion per annum that is required to implement Africa’s NDCs (submitted to the UNFCCC) should be seen not as a climate prerogative but simply as necessary and sensible infrastructure investment.²² The existential and urgent global response to climate change will catalyse the reallocation of capital for carbon capture and storage (through soils, plants and direct air capture), climate adaptation, safe public transport, low carbon building materials and the rapid adoption of renewable energy. Not only are these efforts required over the same timeframe as Africa’s urbanisation megatrend, but African cities are well placed to draw on their adaptability and economic resilience to form part of the global response.²³

Put simply, **from a climate change perspective, the world cannot afford to let African cities urbanise in**

the same manner as industrialised (North American and European) cities. Were African cities to meet their infrastructure needs using the same materials and technologies as industrialised countries, they would add 18.3GtCO_{2e} to the atmosphere in the next decade. That equates to 7% of the total carbon budget available if the world is to have a 66% chance of limiting warming to 1.5°C.²⁴ Similar projections can be applied to energy, private car ownership and solid waste to landfill (Table 2), to reiterate the point that the ability of African cities to develop in innovative low-carbon ways is in the global interest.

The portents of the required capital allocation are already beginning to reward China’s foresight.²⁵ In 2023, 593GW of solar power was installed – 80% of the panels were manufactured in China and 61% of the installed solar capacity was installed in China in 2023.²⁶ Harnessing Africa’s urbanisation dividend will require African leaders to learn from China, see beyond their moral right to continue exploiting coal, oil and gas, acknowledge the shift from commodity-based to technology-based energy sectors, and build cities that are not just landing pads for extractive interests but economically diverse, inclusive cultural hubs.²⁷ This is not currently the strategy of most African countries.

Despite the critical need for energy, and being home to 60% of the “best solar resources globally”, African countries account for less than 1% of global photovoltaic installations.²⁸ In 2022, 48 African countries were still either exploring for or extracting fossil fuels.²⁹ Significant new fossil fuel resources have been recently discovered, including at least 115.34 billion barrels of oil and 21.05 trillion cubic metres of technically recoverable liquified natural gas in Tanzania, Mozambique, Algeria, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea and Nigeria (LNG).³⁰ Gas is touted as a transition fuel and, due to the war in Ukraine, gas generated \$380 billion in profits for the ‘big-five’ fossil fuel companies in 2022/23.³¹ It has not, however, changed the political

19 World Health Organization (WHO), (2023, 2024), Global Health Observatory.

20 Peters, G. P. (2024). Is limiting the temperature increase to 1.5 °C still possible? doi:10.1177/29768659241293218.

21 Mo Ibrahim Foundation (MIF), (2023), COP27: Taking Stock of Progress.

22 Climate Policy Initiative (CPI), (2022), Global Landscape of Climate Finance: A Decade of Data; Pradhan, P. et al., (2025), Policy Relevance of IPCC Reports for the Sustainable Development Goals and Beyond, Resources, Environment and Sustainability, 19, 100-192; Solecki, W. et al., (2018), City Transformations in a 1.5 °C Warmer World, Nature Climate Change, 8, 177–181.

23 Dodman, D., (2009), Blaming Cities for Climate Change? An Analysis of Urban Greenhouse Gas Emissions Inventories, Environment and Urbanization, 21, 185–201.

24 In industrialised countries (Annex 1 countries in the UNFCCC system), per capita emissions in the infrastructure stock has been estimated at 53tCO_{2e} per person, while that for developing countries (Non-Annex 1 countries in the UNFCCC system) has been estimated at 10tCO_{2e} per capita (Müller et al., 2013).

25 Buckley, L., & Hopkins, C., (2021), Engaging with China’s Ecological Civilisation.

26 Carbon Brief, (2025), Analysis: Clean Energy Contributed a Record 10% of China’s GDP in 2024. International Energy Agency (IEA), (2023), Africa Energy Outlook 2022: World Energy Outlook Special Report (Revised in 2023).

27 African Union (AU), (2024), Urban Forum Declaration on Sustainable Urbanisation for Africa’s Transformation (Addis Ababa, 7 September); Pieterse, E., (2023), European Cities Must Do More to Address the Legacy of Colonialism; United Nations University (UNU) & Institute for Natural Resources in Africa (INRA), (2019), Africa’s Development in the Age of Stranded Assets, United Nations University Institute Natural Resources Africa.

28 International Energy Agency (IEA), (2022), Special Report on Solar PV Global Supply Chains.

29 Ganswindt, K. et al., (2023), Who is Financing Fossil Fuel Expansion in Africa?; United Nations University (UNU) & Institute for Natural Resources in Africa (INRA), (2019), Africa’s Development in the Age of Stranded Assets, United Nations University Institute Natural Resources Africa.

30 United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP), (2017), Ogoniland Oil Assessment Reveals Extent of Environmental Contamination and Threats to Human Health, UNEP.

31 Global Witness (2025) Ukraine war third anniversary: Record oil profits and dash for critical minerals amid conflict <https://globalwitness.org/en/press->

economy of the energy sector on the continent or improved access to safe electricity for Africans, in ways that would support an urbanisation dividend.

For African cities, climate change foregrounds the need for wholesale innovation. This includes investments in electrification through renewable energy that generates manufacturing and installation jobs and reduced dependence on biomass (charcoal and wood fuel) as an energy source. It also includes public transport and land zoning policies that encourage compact and connected urban spaces as well as energy efficiency,³² plus the use of bio-based materials for construction³³ and the linking of regenerative forest and agricultural products with urban markets in ways that retain ecological buffers to urban flooding and sequestered carbon in soils.³⁴

This linking of urbanisation and climate responses

would be bolstered by unambiguous positions from African countries on their phasing out of fossil fuel extraction and the removal of subsidies for fossil fuel exploitation and extraction over the next two decades. Thirteen African cities are members of the C40 network, a global network of mayors, committed to limiting warming to 1.5°C by the end of the century and to confronting the climate crisis.³⁵ The longer-standing ICLEI network, or Local Governments for Sustainability, comprises 450 cities and regions across Africa. Despite these efforts, **“African cities are lagging behind internationally, and they show limited evidence of proactive adaptation. ... Those urban adaptation efforts in African cities that have been documented span the range of soft and hard measures [ecological infrastructure for water security in Durban, mangroves in Beira, improved early warning systems] ... nearly all these actions are experimental and supported by international rather than local finance.”**³⁶

TABLE 2: The GHG estimates and economic impact if Africa's urban expansion uses conventional materials and follows a 'business as usual' strategy

If African cities....	Estimated CO2 emitted from African cities 2025-2035	Other consequences	Innovative alternatives
Provide universal access to electricity with current power mix	12.75Gt or 9.8% of global carbon budget for 1.5°C (66% chance)	Economic lock-in to extractive commodities that deliver limited economic benefit. Localised air pollution and water contamination from coal and natural gas	Solar-powered smart- grids in cities in urban suburbs. Solar- and wind-powered utilities that reply on hydro-plants for pump storage
Build housing and infrastructure applying the same materials as OECD countries	12.7Gt-18.3Gt or 10-14% of the global carbon budget for 1.5°C (66% chance)	Construction sector continues dependence on imported materials	Bio-based building materials support local value chains and artisans

[releases/ukraine-war-third-anniversary-record-oil-profits-and-dash-for-critical-minerals-amid-conflict/](#)

³² International Energy Agency (IEA), (2023), Africa Energy Outlook 2022: World Energy Outlook Special Report (Revised in 2023). World Bank, & Deuskar, C., (2021), Primer on Urban Form and Greenhouse Gas Emissions (English) (Gap Fund Technical Note), World Bank Group.

³³ Bai, X. et al., (2018), Six Research Priorities for Cities, Nature, 555, 23–25.

³⁴ Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), (2022), Sixth Assessment Report WGII, Chapter 6.

³⁵ C40 (2024) Casablanca to become 97th C40 city. <https://www.c40.org/news/casablanca-to-become-97th-city-to-join-c40-cities/>

³⁶ Dodman, D., B. Hayward, M. Pelling, V. Castan Broto, W. Chow, E. Chu, R. Dawson, L. Khirfan, T. McPhearson, A. Prakash, Y. Zheng, and G. Ziervogel, (2022) Cities, Settlements and Key Infrastructure. In: Climate Change 2022: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability. Contribution of Working Group II to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [H.-O. Pörtner, D.C. Roberts, M. Tignor, E.S. Poloczanska, K. Mintenbeck, A. Alegria, M. Craig, S. Langsdorf, S. Löschke, V. Möller, A. Okem, B. Rama (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK and New York, NY, USA, pp. 907–1040, doi:10.1017/9781009325844.008.

Increase private car ownership in cities at current rate (from 8% to 12% in the decade)	0.71Gt or 0.52% of the global carbon budget for 1.5°C (66% chance)	Fifty-four million more cars (a near doubling) on urban roads within the decade contributes to congestion, particulate pollution and continued export of vehicle fuels at the expense of trade deficits	Electrical public transport; safe pedestrianisation; compact cities
Continue urban sprawl at their current rate	N/A	Loss of habitat, more time and energy spent commuting, increasing inequality as poor are moved to the margins	Compact, connected and coordinated cities foster economic and social inclusion and reduce the per capita cost of services
Continue waste to landfill following low innovation trajectory	3Gt or 2.3% of the global carbon budget for 1.5°C (66% chance)	Landfills contaminate groundwater and uncollected waste blocks stormwater drains, aggravating flooding	Circular materials flows, e-waste/ waste upcycling and reuse, and green waste is composted

The African Leaders Nairobi Declaration on Climate Change³⁷ set the goal of enhanced participation in global carbon markets. Recent progress has been made in this regard. Thirty-seven African countries have notified the Paris Agreement Crediting Mechanism of their intention to engage in bilateral trades under Article 6. This is an impressive number of countries but accounts for less than 15% of proposed credits. Internationally Transferred Mitigation Outcomes (ITMOs), under Article 6 of the Paris Agreement, have been complemented by debt for nature swaps. One example is the 2023 deal between Gabon, the Bank of America, US International Development Finance Corporation, and The Nature Conservancy in which \$500 million worth of debt was

written down to free up \$125 million on conservation funding. These interventions, much like South Africa's carbon tax and the 12 other African countries planning carbon taxes, tend to be negotiated and planned bilaterally by national governments, and many are blind to the impact on, and of, urbanisation. While a growing number of African cities have climate adaptation plans, there is a conspicuous lack of implementation or fiscal support for these plans from national governments, and investment in urban adaptation has not kept pace with innovations in policy or practice.³⁸ **Linking NDCs, National Urban Policy and industrial strategy development processes, would provide important coherence and resource mobilisation.**

³⁷ African Union (2023) Summary of the African Leaders Nairobi Declaration on Climate Change and Call to Action. https://au.int/sites/default/files/documents/43682-doc-AU_Nairobi_Declaration_Action_1.pdf.

³⁸ Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), (2022), Sixth Assessment Report WGII, Chapter 6.

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
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About the authors of this series

Anton Cartwright is an economist focussed on Africa's urban transition, infrastructure and services, green finance and the interactions between environmental degradation and poverty alleviation. He is an associate at the [African Centre Cities](#) (ACC) at the University of Cape Town, a Fellow of the Cambridge Institute for Sustainability Leadership (CISL) at Cambridge University (UK) and was a Lead Author on Chapter 4 of the [IPCC's Special Report on of 1.5°C](#) of warming released in 2018. He led the [New Climate Economy](#)'s Special Initiative, the [Coalition for Urban Transition](#)'s work in Tanzania and Ghana and was a lead author of South Africa's Just Urban Transition framework in 2023. He is the founding Director of the advisory firm Econologic, and [Credible Carbon](#) South Africa's first voluntary carbon market registry.

Astrid R.N. Haas is an Austrian-Ugandan independent feminist urban economist. Her work bridges research and practice, with a focus on supporting cities to develop strategies and governance systems for financing public infrastructure and services, including climate finance. Her expertise lies in shaping funding and financing mechanisms that embed gender-responsive planning and policies into municipal finance to ensure cities are inclusive and equitable from the outset. She currently serves as Chair of the Board at the Mawazo Institute, is a Research Associate at both the African Centre for Cities (University of Cape Town) and ODI as well as a Fellow for the African Urban Lab (African School of Economics). Her academic background includes an MSc in Public Financial Management from SOAS, University of London, and an MA in International Economics and International Development from Johns Hopkins University. For more information: www.urbanasti.com

Arindam Jana is based at the African Centre of Excellence for Inequality Research at the University of Cape Town (UCT). Trained as an economist, Arindam's scholarship lies at the intersection of urban, spatial, and information economics. His ongoing work in Africa tries to understand how different types of data can be used to interpret complex city-level problems like multidimensional inequality and its spatiality, emergent forms of urbanisation, and wealth accumulation. Prior to UCT, Arindam was based at the Indian Institute for Human Settlements, where he was instrumental in the setting up of its Urban Informatics Lab, and leading numerous projects related to the dynamics of urbanisation in India.



About the Urban2063 Coalition

The Urban2063 Policy Brief Series forms part of a larger initiative led by the African Centre for Cities, University of Cape Town focused on foregrounding the importance of sustainable urbanization as central to Africa's structural transformation in line with the vision of Agenda 2063. During 2025, the work of the Urban2063 Coalition is focused on the deliberations of the G20, with specific focus on the Urban 20 outcomes.

The Urban 2063 Coalition is comprised of contributing partners that include: African Centre for Cities, African Climate and Development Institute, Association of African Planning Schools, ARUP – Africa Region, Cambridge Institute for Sustainability Leadership (Africa chapter), Centre for Sustainability Transitions – Stellenbosch University, Climate KIC, Club of Rome (Africa Section), Urban Futures Studio – Utrecht University, Women in Employment Globalizing and Organizing (WIEGO), World Resource Institute (WRI), Overseas Development Institute (ODI) & GSM Association (GSMA).

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